Sugar crisis engineered
IT was the third year running in which both federal and provincial governments were content to lay the entire blame of sugar crisis on the millers and hoarders rather than acting to stem it.
They blamed the millers, not withstanding the fact that 70 per cent of the mills belonged to politicians who either form these governments or are in the opposition in the assemblies.
Take the second official line of defence, it were hoarders who played the trick. The millers (the ruling elite) obviously know whom are they selling and how much are they selling. Every mill has elaborate paraphernalia of registered dealers and the entire sale is routed through them. The hoarders, thus, do not strike from the blue, but are part of the sale system and can hoard only as much as millers sell to them.
Even if hoarders are ‘taken to be outsiders,’ who is supposed to move against them? Only the governments can, and did they? The hoarders were given almost a week’s time by none other than the interior minister who kept warning them of impending crackdown for a week before actually moving against a few. As if they would be keeping their hoarding intact and waiting for the administration to strike.
To make the matter worse, there were only three raids reported in two major provinces. One raid in Karachi was reported in the media, where over 60,000 tons of sugar was recovered. All others went scot free! Hardly anyone is held responsible thanks to a system that the rulers have devised.
The millers’ defence is equally bizarre. They maintained that they had warned the government of the expected shortage and advised it well in time to import 1.2 million tons to meet the shortfall. The government lent deaf ears.
It is a fact that Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (PSMA) did write letters to the government on the need for import. But it is also a fact, which minutes of all official meeting of sugar boards would testify, that they threatened the government of ‘withholding farmers’ payments of cane,’ if the imports exceeded their advice or even if it violated timing of their choice. They also wanted import to be restricted to raw sugar only even though the mills were not refining units, barring a few.
The government, on its part, did concede the shortfall, and ordered the Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) to import 525,000 tons, instead of 1.2 million tons which was considered to be the shortfall for this year. Then it quietly withheld the money. The TCP took its case to the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the cabinet in June to line up imports for October and November – considered to be crunch time.
The government, however, refused money to the TCP for ‘unexplained reasons.’ Instead of June, the money came by the end of August, and imports were delayed beyond November when crushing season started. Who delayed the release of money and why? No one knows. Who benefited from the delay? Everyone knows.
During the crunch time, when the domestic price spiked by a staggering 70 to 80 per cent by the end of October or be ginning of November, the TCP was holding around 300,000 tons of stocks – more than enough to see the entire country through one month. It, however, kept holding stocks and let the market go into tail’s spin.
The sellers made a staggering Rs270 million in one day alone when price touched the peak. It took the entire media and public outcry to make the TCP release its stocks. Why was it holding the stock? On whose orders was it doing so? No one knows, and no one would probably ever know.
The governments (read politician-owners) have accepted a twisted logic of ‘linking domestic sugar cost to international price,’ to benefit the millers, ignoring the domestic advantage and efforts to fleece consumers. Why should any industrialist, for that matter, be allowed to manufacture something domestically and sell it on international price in the domestic market? Neither the millers nor government officials are ready to explain. The only ex planation is that it benefits the millers at the cost of common man.
Current price pattern makes mockery of even this twisted logic. The imported sugar, which is clearly differentiable from domestic one being smaller in size, is being sold at a lesser price than the domestic one. If the world price is the benchmark, why domestic sugar is expensive? No one is ready to explain.
Sugar trade is protected through a huge system of duty exemptions and preferential loans. When the world prices fall, the government buys it from millers at higher price to ‘save the industry.’ When world prices go up, the burden is passed on to common man in the name of free market.
In such circumstances, small wonder that the entire trade revolves around one, typical to the unbridled objective: fleecing the consumers. Everything is manipulated: import timing, domestic stocks, administrative machinery and political rhetoric.



